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Abstract
Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004) show that the presence of the large
speculator makes all other traders more aggressive in speculative attacks in the foreign
exchange market. We report the results of a preliminary experiment designed to test
their theoretical findings. While the results only partially support the theoretical pre-
dictions of Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004), the results indicate how we
have to adjust our experimental design to test their theoretical findings more precisely.
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1 Introduction
Large speculators, like George Soros or Julian Robertson, have been blamed not only for
destabilizing the market unnecessarily during currency crises, but also for triggering these
crises. For instance, during the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the then prime minister of
Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad, accused George Soros and others of being “the anarchists,
self-serving rogues and international brigandage”.1 Large speculators are often blamed
because they are considered to be able to affect the whole market to some degree. As
opposed to small traders, they can exercise a disproportionate influence on the likelihood
and severity of a financial crisis by fomenting and orchestrating attacks against weakened
currency pegs.
Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004) show that the presence of the large spec-
ulator does indeed make all other speculators more aggressive: relative to the case where
there is no large speculator, small speculators attack the currency when fundamentals are
stronger. This paper reports the results of a preliminary experiment2 designed to test the
predictions of Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004). In particular, the preliminary
experiment tests (A) whether the large speculator makes other small speculators more
aggressive in attacking the peg, and (B) whether the large speculator is more aggressive
in attacking the peg than other small speculators. The preliminary results only partially
support the theoretical predictions: we found that while the large speculator makes other
small speculators more aggressive, the large speculator is less aggressive in attacking the
peg than other small speculators.
This paper’s interest is related to two papers: Heinemann, Nagel, and Ockenfels (2004)
and Cheung and Friedman (2005). Heinemann, Nagel, and Ockenfels (2004) conduct an
experiment to test the predictions of the theory of global games. Their experiment im-
itates the speculative-attack model by Morris and Shin (1998). They conclude that the
global game solution (the so-called threshold strategy) is an important reference point
and provides correct predictions for comparative statics with respect to parameters of the
payoff function. Their experiment, however, is not designed to test the implications of the
1Financial Times, July 25, 1997.
2The difference between a preliminary experiment and a “full” experiment will be explained below.
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existence of the large speculator which is the central issue of our experiment. Cheung and
Friedman (2005) deal with the issue of the large speculator in their experiments. They
conclude that while the presence of a larger speculator increases the likelihood of success-
ful attack, giving the large speculator increased size does not significantly strengthen his
impact. However their experiment design is closer to the first generation models pioneered
by Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984), rather than the global game model of
Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004), in the sense that the economic fundamen-
tals are deteriorating in their experiments to see the timing of speculative attacks. A
concern might be that the experimental design of deteriorating economic fundamentals
could induce the global game solutions (threshold strategies). Morris and Shin (1998) and
Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004) show that threshold strategies are the only
equilibrium strategies even in the absence of deteriorating economic fundamentals. There-
fore, we need to be careful if we interpret the result of their experiments as supportive (or
not supportive) to the global game solutions found by Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and
Shin (2004), because their experiment does not imitate the model by Corsetti, Dasgupta,
Morris, and Shin (2004) very closely. In contrast, our experiment is designed to imitate
the Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004) model as closely as possible, in order to
test the global game solutions. To check whether our experiment is correctly designed,
first we conduct a “preliminary” experiment. In particular, the preliminary experiment
checks whether experiment participants understand the rule of the game correctly (i.e.,
our instruction of the experiment is easily understood by participants) and whether the
computer program used in the experiment works without any problem. Once we obtain
the results of the preliminary experiment, we will think about whether we should adjust
our experimental design to imitate the Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004) model
as precisely as possible. Incorporating such adjustment if necessary, we will proceed to
conduct “full” experiments. This paper reports the results of the preliminary experiment
and discuss how we have to adjust our experimental design to test the findings of Corsetti,
Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004) as precisely as possible in the full experiment.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the speculative-attack model
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Success Failure
Attack D − c −c
Not Attack 0 0
Table 1: Payoff Matrix
used in our preliminary experiment. Section 3 lays out the experimental design. In
Section 4 we present the preliminary results and discuss issues to note when we conduct
“full” experiments. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
In our experiment, we employ a reduced game form based on Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris,
and Shin (2004) with a finite number of speculators who decide simultaneously whether
to attack the currency peg or not.
Consider an economy where the central bank pegs the exchange rate. The economy is
characterized by a state of underlying economic fundamentals, Y . A low value of Y refers
to good fundamentals while a high value refers to bad fundamentals. We assume that Y
is randomly drawn from the interval [Y, Y¯ ], with each realization equally likely.
Now assume that there are two kinds of speculators: a single large speculator (“Soros”)
and m small speculators (m is some positive integer). Each small speculator can short-sell
one unit of the domestic currency. The distinguishing feature of the large speculator is his
access to a larger line of credit in the domestic currency to take a short position up to the
limit of λ (≥ 1). Just for simplicity, we assume λ is an integer. We call it “Soros case”.
Later we will consider “No-Soros case” where there are m+λ small speculators and there
is no large speculator.
Receiving the possibly noisy private signal about economic fundamentals, a speculator
decides whether to short sell the currency, i.e., to attack the currency peg. An attack is
associated with opportunity costs c. If the currency devalues, each attacking speculator
earns an amount D. To make the model more interesting, we assume that a successful
attack is profitable: D − c > 0.
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Whether the current exchange rate parity is viable depends on the strength of the
economic fundamentals and the incidence of speculative attack against the peg. The
incidence of speculative attack is measured by the mass of speculators attacking the peg
as follows.
N = k + λ · I[Soros attacks] (1)
where k is the number of small speculators who attack the peg and I[Soros attacks] is
the indicator function which takes the value of unity if Soros attacks and zero otherwise.
Therefore the possible maximum number of N is m+λ. An attack is successful if and only
if a sufficient number of speculators decide to attack. The better the state of the economy,
the higher the hurdle to success: the hurdle to success is modelled as a nonincreasing
function of Y . Let a(Y ) be the size of speculative attacks that are needed to enforce a
devaluation and assume a′ ≤ 0 and a(Y¯ ) < 0 < m + λ < a(Y). The currency peg fails if
and only if
N ≥ a(Y ). (2)
When the economic fundamentals are sufficiently strong (i.e., Y satisfies a(Y ) > m +
λ), the currency peg is maintained irrespective of the actions of the speculators. When
the economic fundamentals are sufficiently weak (i.e., Y satisfies a(Y ) ≤ 0), the peg is
abandoned even in the absence of a speculative attack. The most interesting range is the
intermediate case when 0 < a(Y ) ≤ m+λ. Here the government is forced to abandon the
peg if a sufficient proportion of speculators attacks the currency, whereas the peg will be
maintained if a sufficient proportion of speculators choose not to attack. This tripartite
classification of fundamentals follows Obstfeld (1996). In what follows, we call it a crisis
if the government abandons the peg and no crisis if the government defends the peg.
Although speculators do not observe the realization of Y , they receive informative
private signals about it. When the true state is Y , a speculator i observes a signal
xi = Y + εi that is drawn uniformly from the interval [Y − ε, Y + ε] (ε ≥ 0). Conditional
on Y , the signals are i.i.d. across individuals. Note that there is no difference, at least
in terms of precision, between Soros’ private signal and small speculators’ private signals.
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In the model, the only difference between Soros and the small speculators is their size. In
order to focus on the size effect as clearly as possible, we exclude the possibility that Soros
has better information about economic fundamentals than the small speculators.
As regards speculators’ preferences, the expected utility from attacking the currency
conditional on her private signal is the following.
U = Prob [N ≥ a(Y )| xi]D − c
Here Prob [N ≥ a(Y )| xi] is the probability that her attack is successful conditional on her
private signal.
The timing of the game is structured as follows.
• Nature chooses the value of Y .
• Each speculator receives a private signal xi = Y + εi.
• Each speculator decides whether or not to attack the currency peg.
• The central bank abandons the peg if N ≥ a(Y ) and defends the peg otherwise.
• If the attack is successful, those who attacked getD−c. If the attack is not successful,
their payoff is −c. The payoff of those who did not attack is zero.
2.1 Common Knowledge Case
Before investigating the case ε > 0, consider the case where there is no noise in the signal:
ε = 0. In this case, the realization of Y is common knowledge among the speculators.
In this case there are multiple equilibria when λ < a(Y ) ≤ m + λ: the crisis is the
equilibrium if all the speculators coordinate an attack, while no crisis is the equilibrium
if no speculator attacks. In the multiple equilibria, there is no clear implication of the
existence of Soros. To see this, suppose that there are m+ λ small speculators and there
is no Soros in the market. We call it No-Soros case. Note that in this case the possible
maximum number of N , which is m+ λ, is the same as the one in Soros case. Notice also
that there are multiple equilibria, the crisis and no crisis, in No-Soros case as in Soros
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case. Within multiple equilibria framework, there is no significant difference in terms of
equilibrium selection between Soros-case and No-Soros-case when λ < a(Y ) ≤ m + λ: it
is not very clear whether or not the existence of Soros affects equilibrium selection when
λ < a(Y ) ≤ m + λ and how. In order to consider implications of the existence of Soros,
it would be useful to refine multiple equilibria to clarify how one particular equilibrium is
selected over another.
2.2 Non-Common Knowledge Case
A feature already familiar from the discussion of global games in the literature is that
when ε > 0, the realization of Y will not be common knowledge among the speculators.
Applying the global game approach, Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004) have
shown that in this case there is a unique equilibrium in which the small speculators use
the switching strategy around X∗ while Soros use the switching strategy around X∗∗. X∗
is a threshold signal such that small speculators attack if and only if they receive a signal
above this threshold. X∗∗ is a threshold signal such that Soros attacks if and only if he
receives a signal above this threshold. Moreover, Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin
(2004) have shown that the presence of Soros does indeed make all other speculators more
aggressive in their attacking.
A risk neutral speculator who receives the threshold signal is indifferent between at-
tacking and not attacking provided that all other speculators attack if and only if they
receive signals above their threshold signal. At state Y the probability that Soros’ attack
is successful is given by the probability that at least a(Y )− λ out of m small speculators
get signals above X∗ and attack. This can be described by the binomial distribution. The
probability that a single speculator gets a signal above X∗ at state Y is (Y −X∗+ε)/(2ε).
Denoting the round-up of a(Y ) by aˆ(Y ), the expected payoff of attacking Soros with the
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threshold signal is
EU(X∗∗)
=
1
2ε
∫ X∗∗+ε
X∗∗−ε
D · Prob [k ≥ aˆ(Y )− λ] dY
=
1
2ε
∫ X∗∗+ε
X∗∗−ε
D ·
(
1− Prob [k ≤ aˆ(Y )− λ− 1]
)
dY
=
1
2ε
∫ X∗∗+ε
X∗∗−ε
D ·
(
1−
aˆ(Y )−λ−1∑
k=0
(
m
k
)(
Y −X∗ + ε
2ε
)k (
1− Y −X
∗ + ε
2ε
)m−k)
dY
=
1
2ε
∫ X∗∗+ε
X∗∗−ε
D ·
(
1− Bin
[
aˆ(Y )− λ− 1,m, Y −X
∗ + ε
2ε
])
dY, (3)
where Bin is the cumulative binomial distribution. The equilibrium threshold signal X∗∗
is defined by
EU(X∗∗) = c. (4)
At state Y the probability that a small speculator’s attack is successful is given by
the sum of the following: (1) the probability that at least a(Y ) − λ − 1 out of m − 1
small speculators receive private signals above X∗ and Soros receive private signal above
X∗∗ and then they attack, and (2) the probability that at least a(Y ) − 1 out of m − 1
small speculators receive private signals above X∗ and attack but Soros receives private
signal below X∗∗ so he does not attack. Let the former be P1(Y ) and the latter be P2(Y ).
Notice that private signals are independent across speculators (and hence between Soros
and small speculators) conditional on Y . Therefore, these two probabilities can be written
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as follows.
P1(Y ) = Prob [Soros attacks at state Y ] · Prob [k ≥ aˆ(Y )− λ− 1]
= Prob [xi ≥ X∗∗] ·
(
1− Prob [k ≤ aˆ(Y )− λ− 2]
)
=
Y −X∗∗ + ε
2ε
·
(
1− Bin
[
aˆ(Y )− λ− 2,m− 1, Y −X
∗ + ε
2ε
])
(5)
P2(Y ) = Prob [Soros does not attack at state Y ] · Prob [k ≥ aˆ(Y )− 1]
= Prob [xi < X∗∗] ·
(
1− Prob [k ≤ aˆ(Y )− 2]
)
=
(
1− Y −X
∗∗ + ε
2ε
)
·
(
1− Bin
[
aˆ(Y )− 2,m− 1, Y −X
∗ + ε
2ε
])
. (6)
The expected payoff of an attacking small speculator with the threshold signal is
EU(X∗) =
1
2ε
∫ X∗+ε
X∗−ε
D ·
(
P1(Y ) + P2(Y )
)
dY. (7)
The equilibrium threshold signal X∗ is defined by
EU(X∗) = c. (8)
3 Experimental Design
Sessions were run at a PC pool in the School of Political Science and Economics at Waseda
University, Tokyo on June 28, 2005. There were 10 participants. Most of the participants
were economics undergraduates. The experiment was programmed and conducted with
the software z-Tree (Fischbacher (1999)). Instructions were read aloud. Throughout the
sessions participants were not allowed to communicate and could not see others’ screens.
First, we ran 1 session for No-Soros case. Next, we ran 1 session for Soros case.
In No-Soros case, there are 10 “small” subjects and no “large” subject (i.e., no Soros).
In this case, the possible maximum number of N is 10 in No-Soros case.
In Soros case, subjects are split evenly into two groups. The session for Soros case
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was conducted in each group separately. Out of 5 subjects in each group, 4 subjects
were “small” and 1 subject was “large” (Soros). We set λ = 6. Therefore, the possible
maximum number of N in each group is again 10 (m+ λ = 4 + 6 = 10 in each group) in
Soros case.
Each session consisted of 10 independent rounds. In each round all subjects had to
decide between alternatives A and B for 5 independent situations. In Soros case, 1 subject
was randomly chosen as Soros in each round. Thus the subject who was chosen as Soros
could be different across 10 rounds.
For each situation, a state Y , the same for all subjects, was randomly selected from
a uniform distribution in the interval [30, 90]. Instead of being informed about Y , each
subject received a private noisy signal, independently and randomly drawn from a uniform
distribution in the interval [Y -10, Y+10]. These numbers were displayed with two decimal
digits. We did not order the signals so as not to induce so-called threshold strategies. We
did not conduct sessions with common information where subjects were informed about
Y . In the preliminary experiment, we conducted only sessions with private information,
concentrating on seeing the difference between No-Soros case and Soros case when signal
are noisy and private.
The payoff for alternative A was Y=10 with certainty. The payoff for B was Y=30, if
N ≥ a(Y ) = 20−Y/4 held, zero otherwise. All parameters of the game and the rules were
common knowledge except for drawn states Y and private signals.
Once all players had completed their decisions in one round, they saw — for each
situation — the value of Y , how many people had chosen A, how many people had chosen
B, payoff of A, payoff of B (which automatically showed whether action B was successful
or not), and their individual payoffs. After all players had left the information screen a
new round started and information of previous rounds could not be revisited. Subjects
were allowed to take notes and many of them did.
After two sessions finished, participants had to respond to eight questions about their
behavior in a questionnaire and were free to give additional comments regarding the ex-
periment. Once the questionnaire was completed, each participant was paid in private.
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The experiment length was about 100 minutes.
4 Results
Our main question is whether or not speculators attack the peg (i.e., subjects choose B)
more aggressively in Soros case than in No-Soros case. In order to answer this question, we
estimate the probability with which a subject i chooses B by fitting a logistic distribution
function to observed choices.3
Prob[Subject i chooses B] =
exp(β0 + β1xi + β2I[Soros case] + β3I[Large])
1 + exp(β0 + β1xi + β2I[Soros case] + β3I[Large])
(9)
where I[Soros case] is a dummy variable which takes the value of unity in Soros case and
zero in No-Soros case, and I[Large] is a dummy variable which takes the value of unity
if a subject i is chosen as Soros and zero otherwise. Theoretical predictions of the global
game solutions are the following.
1. A subject is more likely to choose B when he receives a larger signal (β1 > 0).
2. A subject is more likely to choose B in Soros case than in No-Soros case (β2 > 0).
3. A subject is more likely to choose B when he is chosen as Soros than otherwise
(β3 > 0).
4.1 Results: All Sample
Estimation results obtained from all sample are summarized in Table 2. β0, β1 and β2 are
significant at the 1 % level. Moreover, the signs of β1 and β2 are positive as theoretical
predictions. However, the sign of β3 is negative, as opposed to theoretical prediction,
although it is insignificant. This indicates a subject is less aggressive in attacking the peg
when he is chosen as Soros than otherwise.
3The logistic distribution is more appropriate than the normal distribution, because we observe ‘fat tails’
due to irrational behavior of a few subjects who do not play threshold strategies. Moreover, estimation
results of the probit model is qualitatively similar to those of the logit model. They are available upon
request.
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Table 2: Estimation Results : All Sample
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) (P value)
Constant -19.994 (1.685) (0.000)
xi 0.349 (0.029) (0.000)
I[Soros case] 1.840 (0.363) (0.000)
I[Large] -0.114 (0.524) (0.828)
Figure 1: Estimation Results : All Sample
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Predicted probabilities of choosing B are depicted in Figure 1. The curve of the
predicted probabilities of choosing B when the subject is not chosen as Soros in Soros
case (the curve marked with the square symbol “¥”) is almost overlapped by the curve
of the predicted probabilities of choosing B when the subject is chosen as Soros in Soros
case (the curve marked with the triangle symbol “N”). These two curves are positioned
to the left of the curve of the predicted probabilities of choosing B in No-Soros case (the
curve marked with the lozenge symbol “¨”). This means that subjects are more likely to
choose B in Soros case than in No-Soros case (β2 > 0). Since the estimated coefficient on
I[Large] is not so large in magnitude, two curves in Soros case are almost overlapped.
4.2 Results: Subsample
In theory, it is reasonable if the coefficient on I[Large] is positive. However the estimated
coefficient is negative although it is insignificant. In this subsection we discuss why we
obtain this seemingly inconsistent result. Then we discuss issues to note when we conduct
“full” experiments.
First, we identified which subjects seemed to behave less aggressively when they were
chosen as Soros. Their behavior appears to account for the inconsistent result. Then
we asked them why they became less aggressive when they were chosen as Soros. Their
answer was as follows. They wanted to be “the top trader”: from their viewpoints, their
relative ranking was more important than the absolute amount of money itself. To see
the meaning of this in more detail, consider the following two cases. The first case is
that you earn $1,000 when everyone else earns $2,000. The second case is that you earn
$500 when every one else earns $100. If your objective is simply to maximize the absolute
amount of money you earn, as in Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004), you will
prefer the first case to the second case. However if your objective is to be the top trader
irrespective of the absolute amount of money you earn, you will prefer the second case,
because your relative performance is the best in the second case and the worst in the
first case. A few subjects had the latter objective function. What were their strategies
to be the top trader? First, they “correctly” anticipated that other subjects were more
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likely to choose B in Soros case than in No-Soros case. Second, when they were chosen as
Soros, they chose A in order to make other subjects’ likely choice of B fail. Under certain
situations, Soros has a “casting vote” in determining whether the choice B is successful
or not. In other words, under certain situations the choice B is successful if and only if
Soros chooses B, other things being equal. Suppose you are Soros in such a situation. If
you want to maximize the absolute amount of money you get, of course you will choose B.
But if you want to be the top trader, it might be optimal for you to choose A rather than
B. In that case, the payoff for other subjects choosing B will be zero while your payoff
will be c. In terms of relative ranking, you can go beyond other subjects by choosing A.
Therefore, you have an incentive to choose B less aggressively when you are Soros under
certain situations. In fact, this is why some subjects behaved less aggressively when they
were chosen as Soros.
Although this “want-to-be-the-top-trader” behavior may be interesting, it is not the
same as profit-maximizing behavior that Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004)
assumed. In Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004), speculators care not about
their relative ranking but only about their (expected) profit. We will not claim that profit-
maximizing behavior is “correct” and “want-to-be-the-top-trader” behavior is “wrong”.
Rather our purpose in the experiments is to see whether the theoretical predictions of
Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004) would hold. In other words, we are interested
in what would happen if every speculator behaves to maximize their profit irrespective of
their relative ranking. Therefore, when we conduct “full” experiments, we will need to
emphasize that we want participants to concentrate on maximizing their profit.
Through our conversations with subjects after the preliminary experiment, we found
that subjects who “wanted to be the top trader” happened to be chosen as Soros after the
4th round. Until the 3rd round, subjects who concentrated on maximizing their profits
irrespective of their relative ranking happened to be chosen as Soros. In order to see what
had happened before subjects who “want to be the top trader” were chosen as Soros, we
re-estimated equation (9) by using subsample: we exclude sample after the 4th round.
This re-estimation uses all sample (10 rounds) in No-Soros case and subsample in Soros
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case (until the 3rd round). The results of this re-estimation may give us some flavor of
a possible result of full experiments where all subjects concentrate on maximizing their
profits.
The results are summarized in Table 3. β0, β1, β2 are significant at the 1% level and
β3 is significant at the 5% level. Moreover, the signs of β1, β2 and β3 are positive as
theoretical predictions. This indicates that a subject is more aggressive in attacking the
peg when he is chosen as Soros than otherwise. This is the same as the predictions of the
global game solutions.
Table 3: Estimation Results: Subsample
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) (P value)
Constant -21.710 (2.302) (0.000)
xi 0.379 (0.039) (0.000)
I[Soros case] 2.115 (0.560) (0.000)
I[Large] 2.399 (1.014) (0.018)
Predicted probabilities of choosing B are depicted in Figure 2. As can be seen, the
curve of the predicted probabilities of choosing B when the subject is chosen as Soros
is positioned to the extreme left. The curve of the predicted probabilities of choosing B
when the subject is not chosen as Soros in Soros case is positioned in the middle. The
curve of the predicted probabilities of choosing B in No-Soros case is positioned to the
extreme right. This means that subjects are more likely to choose B in Soros case than in
No-Soros case (β2 > 0). Moreover, this means that subjects are more likely to choose B
when they are chosen as Soros than otherwise (β3 > 0).
The results of re-estimation indicate that we may be able to obtain the results that
support Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004) if we can adjust the experimental
design such that all participants have the same objective function as the one in Corsetti,
Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004) (i.e., all participants are profit-maximizer). Therefore,
when we conduct full experiments to test the predictions of Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris,
and Shin (2004), it will be very important to design such that all participants care about
their profits irrespective of their relative ranking.
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Figure 2: Estimation Results : Subsample
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5 Conclusion and Future Research
This paper reported the results of a preliminary experiment designed to test the predictions
of Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004). In particular, the preliminary experiment
tests (A) whether the large speculator makes other small speculators more aggressive in
attacking the peg, and (B) whether the large speculator is more aggressive in attacking
the peg than other small speculators. The preliminary results only partially support the
theoretical predictions: while the large speculator makes other small speculators more
aggressive, the large speculator is less aggressive in attacking the peg than other small
speculators.
We argue that this result which differs from Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin
(2004) is due to the fact that the objective function of some participants in the preliminary
experiment were different from that of speculators assumed in Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris,
and Shin (2004). Indeed, if we exclude such participants from the sample, the estimated
result is that the large speculator is more aggressive in attacking the peg than other small
15
speculators. Thus we have to adjust the experimental design of full experiments such
that all participants have the same objective function as the one assumed in Corsetti,
Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004).
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